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Abstract
This paper presents a general mean-field game (GMFG) framework for simultaneous learning
and decision-making in stochastic games with a large population. It first establishes the existence
of a unique Nash Equilibrium to this GMFG, and demonstrates that naively combining Q-
learning with the fixed-point approach in classical MFGs yields unstable algorithms. It then
proposes value-based and policy-based reinforcement learning algorithms (GMF-P and GMF-P
respectively) with smoothed policies, with analysis of convergence property and computational
complexity. The experiments on repeated Ad auction problems demonstrate that GMF-V-Q, a
specific GMF-V algorithm based on Q-learning, is efficient and robust in terms of convergence
and learning accuracy. Moreover, its performance is superior in convergence, stability, and
learning ability, when compared with existing algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning.
1 Introduction
Motivating example. This paper is motivated by the following Ad auction problem for an
advertiser. An Ad auction is a stochastic game on an Ad exchange platform among a large number
of players, the advertisers. In between the time a web user requests a page and the time the page
is displayed, usually within a millisecond, a Vickrey-type of second-best-price auction is run to
incentivize interested advertisers to bid for an Ad slot to display advertisement. Each advertiser
has limited information before each bid: first, her own valuation for a slot depends on an unknown
conversion of clicks for the item; secondly, she, should she win the bid, only knows the reward after
the user’s activities on the website are finished. In addition, she has a budget constraint in this
repeated auction.
The question is, how should she bid in this online sequential repeated game when there is a large
population of bidders competing on the Ad platform, with unknown distributions of the conversion
of clicks and rewards?
Besides the Ad auction, there are many real-world problems involving a large number of players
and unknown systems. Examples include massive multi-player online role-playing games [30], high
frequency tradings [35], and the sharing economy [24].
Our work. Motivated by these problems, we consider a general framework of simultaneous learning
and decision-making in stochastic games with a large population. We formulate a general mean-field-
game (GMFG) with incorporation of action distributions, (randomized) relaxed policies, and with
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unknown rewards and dynamics. This general framework can also be viewed as a generalized version
of MFGs of McKean-Vlasov type [1], which is a different paradigm from the classical MFG. It is
also beyond the scope of the existing reinforcement learning (RL) framework for Markov decision
problem (MDP) with unknown distributions, as MDP is technically equivalent to a single player
stochastic game.
On the theory front, this general framework differs from all existing MFGs. We establish under
appropriate technical conditions, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) to this
GMFG. On the computational front, we show that naively combining reinforcement learning with the
three-step fixed-point approach in classical MFGs yields unstable algorithms. We then propose both
value based and policy based reinforcement learning algorithms with smoothed policies (GMF-V and
GMF-P respectively), establish the convergence property and analyze the computational complexity.
Finally, we apply GMF-V-Q, a specific Q-learning based GMF-V algorithm to the Ad auction
problem, where this GMF-V-Q algorithm demonstrates its efficiency and robustness in terms of
convergence and learning. Moreover, its performance is superior, when compared with existing
algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning, in terms of convergence, stability, and learning
accuracy.
Related works. On learning large population games with mean-field approximations, [52] focuses
on inverse reinforcement learning for MFGs without decision making, [53] studies an MARL problem
with a first-order mean-field approximation term modeling the interaction between one player and all
the other finite players, and [33] and [54] consider model-based adaptive learning for MFGs in specific
models (e.g., linear-quadratic and oscillator games). More recently, [38] studies the local convergence
of actor-critic algorithms on finite time horizon MFGs, and [48] proposes a policy-gradient based
algorithm and analyzes the so-called local NE for reinforcement learning in infinite time horizon
MFGs. For learning large population games without mean-field approximation, see [25, 32] and
the references therein. In the specific topic of learning auctions with a large number of advertisers,
[8] and [31] explore reinforcement learning techniques to search for social optimal solutions with
real-word data, and [29] uses MFGs to model the auction system with unknown conversion of clicks
within a Bayesian framework.
However, none of these works consider the problem of simultaneous learning and decision-making
in a general MFG framework. Neither do they establish the existence and uniqueness of the (global)
NE, nor do they present model-free learning algorithms with complexity analysis and convergence to
the NE. Note that in principle, global results are harder to obtain compared to local results.
We remark that following the conference version [22] of the current paper (which focuses only
on GMF-V-Q), various efforts have been made to extend reinforcement learning of MFGs to more
general settings with continuous states and actions [2, 12, 14]. In the meantime, the idea of
simultaneous learning and decision making with mean-field interaction has also motivated the works
on collaborative games with social optimal solution [9, 10, 19, 20, 37].
2 Framework of General MFG (GMFG)
2.1 Background: classical N-player Markovian game and MFG
Let us first recall the classical N -player game. There are N players in a game. At each step t, the
state of player i (= 1, 2, · · · , N) is sit ∈ S ⊆ Rd and she takes an action ait ∈ A ⊆ Rp. Here d, p
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are positive integers, and S and A are compact (for example, finite) state space and action space,
respectively. Given the current state profile of N -players st = (s1t , . . . , sNt ) ∈ SN and the action ait,
player i will receive a reward ri(st, ait) and her state will change to sit+1 according to a transition
probability function P i(st, ait).
A Markovian game further restricts the admissible policy/control for player i to be of the form
ait = pi
i
t(st). That is, piit : SN → P(A) maps each state profile s ∈ SN to a randomized action, with
P(X ) the space of probability measures on space X . The accumulated reward (a.k.a. the value
function) for player i, given the initial state profile s and the policy profile sequence pi := {pit}∞t=0
with pit = (pi1t , . . . , piNt ), is then defined as
V i(s,pi) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtri(st, a
i
t)
∣∣∣s0 = s] , (1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, ait ∼ piit(st), and sit+1 ∼ P i(st, ait). The goal of each player is
to maximize her value function over all admissible policy sequences.
In general, this type of stochastic N -player game is notoriously hard to analyze, especially when N
is large [41]. Mean field game (MFG), pioneered by [28] and [34] in the continuous settings and later
developed in [6, 18, 27, 36, 45] for discrete settings, provides an ingenious and tractable aggregation
approach to approximate the otherwise challenging N -player stochastic games. The basic idea for
an MFG goes as follows. Assume all players are identical, indistinguishable and interchangeable,
when N →∞, one can view the limit of other players’ states s−it = (s1t , . . . , si−1t , si+1t , . . . , sNt ) as a
population state distribution µt with µt(s) := limN→∞
∑N
j=1,j 6=i Isjt=s
N .
1 Due to the homogeneity of
the players, one can then focus on a single (representative) player. That is, in an MFG, one may
consider instead the following optimization problem,
maximizepi V (s,pi,µ) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at, µt)|s0 = s
]
subject to st+1 ∼ P (st, at, µt), at ∼ pit(st, µt),
where pi := {pit}∞t=0 denotes the policy sequence and µ := {µt}∞t=0 the distribution flow. In this MFG
setting, at time t, after the representative player chooses her action at according to some policy pit,
she will receive reward r(st, at, µt) and her state will evolve under a controlled stochastic dynamics
of a mean-field type P (·|st, at, µt). Here the policy pit depends on both the current state st and the
current population state distribution µt such that pi : S × P(S)→ P(A).
2.2 General MFG (GMFG)
In the classical MFG setting, the reward and the dynamic for each player are known. They depend
only on the state of the player st, the action of this particular player at, and the population state
distribution µt. In contrast, in the motivating auction example, the reward and the dynamic are
unknown; they rely on the actions of all players, as well as on st and µt.
We therefore define the following general MFG (GMFG) framework. At time t, after the
representative player chooses her action at according to some policy pi : S × P(S)→ P(A), she will
receive a (possibly random) reward r(st, at,Lt) and her state will evolve according to P (·|st, at,Lt),
1Here the indicator function I
s
j
t=s
= 1 if sjt = s and 0 otherwise.
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where r and P are possibly unknown. We assume that r is a.s. non-negative and uniformly bounded
(i.e., there exists some constant C > 0 such that 0 ≤ r(s, a,L) ≤ C a.s. for any s, a and L). This
assumption can be relaxed to sub-Gaussian or sub-exponential tail bounds on the reward, but we
assume a.s. boundedness for the clarity of the analysis. The objective of the player is to solve the
following control problem:
maximizepi V (s,pi,L) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at,Lt)|s0 = s
]
subject to st+1 ∼ P (st, at,Lt), at ∼ pit(st, µt).
(GMFG)
Here, L := {Lt}∞t=0, with Lt = Pst,at ∈ P(S×A) the joint distribution of the state and the action (i.e.,
the population state-action pair). Lt has marginal distributions αt for the population action and µt
for the population state. Notice that {Lt}∞t=0 could be time dependent. That is, an infinite-time
horizon MFG could still have time-dependent NE solutions due to the mean information process in
the MFG. This is fundamentally different from the theory of MDP where the optimal control, if
exists uniquely, would be time independent in an infinite time horizon setting.
In this paper, we will analyze the existence of NE to GMFG. For ease of exposition, we will
first focus on stationry NEs. Accordingly, for notational brevity, we abbreviate pi = {pi}∞t=0 and
L = {L}∞t=0 as pi and L, respectively. We will show in the end how this stationary constraint can be
relaxed (cf. §8).
Definition 2.1 (Stationary NE for GMFGs). In (GMFG), a player-population profile (pi?, L?) is
called a stationary NE if
1. (Single player side) For any policy pi and any initial state s ∈ S,
V (s, pi?,L?) ≥ V (s, pi,L?) . (2)
2. (Population side) Pst,at = L? for all t ≥ 0, where {st, at}∞t=0 is the dynamics under the policy pi?
starting from s0 ∼ µ?, with at ∼ pi?(st, µ?), st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at,L?), and µ? being the population
state marginal of L?.
The single player side condition captures the optimality of pi?, when the population side is fixed.
The population side condition ensures the “consistency” of the solution: it guarantees that the state
and action distribution flow of the single player does match the population state and action sequence
L? := {L?}∞t=0.
A toy example. Take a two-state dynamic system with two choices of controls. The state space S
= {0, 1}, the action space A = {L,R}. Here the action L means to move left and R means to move
right. The dynamic of the representative agent in the mean-field system {st}t≥1 goes as follows: if
the agent is in state st and she takes action at = L at time t, then st+1 = 0; if she takes action at = R,
then st+1 = 1. At the end of each round, the agent will receive a reward −W2(µt, B)−W2(βt(st, ·), B),
which depends on all agents, where W2 is the `2-Wasserstein distance. Here µt(·) denotes the state
distribution of the mean-field population at time t, βt(s, ·) := Lt(s, ·)/µt(s) denotes the action
distribution of the population in state s (s = 0, 1) at time t (set βt(s, ·) := (0.5, 0.5) when µt(s) = 0),
and B is a given Binomial distribution with parameter p (0 < p < 1).
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Note that −W2(µ,B) ≤ 0 for any distribution µ over S. Similarly, −W2(α,B) ≤ 0 for any
distribution α over A. Hence for each policy pi, given population distribution flow L = {Lt}∞t=1,
V (0,pi,L) = −
∞∑
t=1
γtE[W2(µt, B) +W2(βt(st, ·), B)|s0 = 0] ≤ 0, (3)
and
V (1,pi,L) = −
∞∑
t=1
γtE[W2(µt, B) +W2(βt(st, ·), B)|s0 = 1] ≤ 0. (4)
It is easy to check that the stationary mean-field solution is µ∗ = (1− p, p) and pi∗(s) = (1− p, p)
(s = 0, 1). And L? is defined with L?(s, a) = µ?(s)pi?(s, a) for any s ∈ S, a ∈ A, accordingly. In
this case, the corresponding optimal value function is defined as
V (0, pi∗,L∗) = V (1, pi∗,L∗) = 0.
3 Solution for GMFGs
We now establish the existence and uniqueness of the stationary NE to (GMFG), by generalizing the
classical fixed-point approach for MFGs to this GMFG setting. (See [28] and [34] for the classical
case.) It consists of three steps.
Step A. Fix L, (GMFG) becomes the classical single-player optimization problem. Indeed,
with L fixed, the population state distribution µ is also fixed, and hence the space of admissible
policies is reduced to the single-player case. Solving (GMFG) is now reduced to finding a policy
pi?L ∈ Π := {pi |pi : S → P(A)} to maximize
V (s, piL,L) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at,L)|s0 = s
]
,
subject to st+1 ∼ P (st, at,L), at ∼ piL(st).
Notice that with L fixed, one can safely suppress the dependency on µ in the admissible policies.
Now given this fixed L and the solution pi?L to the above optimization problem, one can define a
mapping from the fixed population distribution L to a chosen optimal randomized policy sequence.
That is,
Γ1 : P(S ×A)→ Π,
such that pi?L = Γ1(L). Note that this pi?L satisfies the single player side condition in Definition 2.1
for the population state-action pair L,
V (s, pi?L,L) ≥ V (s, pi,L) , (5)
for any policy pi and any initial state s ∈ S.
As in the MFG literature [28], a feedback regularity condition is needed for analyzing Step A.
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Assumption 1. There exists a constant d1 ≥ 0, such that for any L,L′ ∈ P(S ×A),
D(Γ1(L),Γ1(L′)) ≤ d1W1(L,L′), (6)
where
D(pi, pi′) := sup
s∈S
W1(pi(s), pi
′(s)), (7)
and W1 is the `1-Wasserstein distance (a.k.a. earth mover distance) between probability measures
[17, 44, 50].
Step B. Given pi?L obtained from Step A, update the initial L to L′ following the controlled
dynamics P (·|st, at,L).
Accordingly, for any admissible policy pi ∈ Π and a joint population state-action pair L ∈ P(S×A),
define a mapping Γ2 : Π× P(S ×A)→ P(S ×A) as follows:
Γ2(pi,L) := Lˆ = Ps1,a1 , (8)
where a1 ∼ pi(s1), s1 ∼ µP (·|·, a0,L), a0 ∼ pi(s0), s0 ∼ µ, and µ is the population state marginal of
L.
One needs a standard assumption in this step.
Assumption 2. There exist constants d2, d3 ≥ 0, such that for any admissible policies pi, pi1, pi2
and joint distributions L,L1,L2,
W1(Γ2(pi1,L),Γ2(pi2,L)) ≤ d2D(pi1, pi2), (9)
W1(Γ2(pi,L1),Γ2(pi,L2)) ≤ d3W1(L1,L2). (10)
Step C. Repeat Step A and Step B until L′ matches L.
This step is to ensure the population side condition. To ensure the convergence of the combined
step one and step two, it suffices if Γ : P(S × A) → P(S × A) with Γ(L) := Γ2(Γ1(L),L) is a
contractive mapping under the W1 distance. Then by the Banach fixed point theorem and the
completeness of the related metric spaces (cf. Appendix A), there exists a unique stationary NE of
the GMFG. That is,
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of stationary GMFG solution). Given Assu-
mptions 1 and 2, and assume d1d2 + d3 < 1. Then there exists a unique stationary NE to (GMFG).
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 1] First by Definition 2.1 and the definitions of Γi (i = 1, 2), (pi,L) is
a stationary NE iff L = Γ(L) = Γ2(Γ1(L),L) and pi = Γ1(L), where Γ(L) = Γ2(Γ1(L),L). This
indicates that for any L1,L2 ∈ P(S ×A),
W1(Γ(L1),Γ(L2)) = W1(Γ2(Γ1(L1),L1),Γ2(Γ1(L2),L2))
≤W1(Γ2(Γ1(L1),L1),Γ2(Γ1(L2),L1)) +W1(Γ2(Γ1(L2),L1),Γ2(Γ1(L2),L2))
≤ (d1d2 + d3)W1(L1,L2).
(11)
And since d1d2 + d3 ∈ [0, 1), by the Banach fixed-point theorem, we conclude that there exists a
unique fixed-point of Γ, or equivalently, a unique stationary MFG solution to (GMFG).
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Remark 1 (Extension to the non-stationary setting). Theorem 1 can be extended to a non-stationary
setting. See §8 for the corresponding problem formulation, equilibrium definition, and existence for
the non-stationary GMFG.
Remark 2. Assumptions 1 and 2 can be more explicit in specific problem settings. For instance,
when the action space is convex, explicit conditions on P and r have been described for the mean-
field linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) settings [14]. The results are later generalized beyond the
LQR settings in [2]. When the action space is finite, the following lemma explicitly characterizes
Assumption 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose that maxs,a,L,s′ P (s′|s, a,L) ≤ c1, and that P (s′|s, a, ·) is c2-Lipschitz in W1,
i.e.,
|P (s′|s, a,L1)− P (s′|s, a,L2)| ≤ c2W1(L1,L2). (12)
Then in Assumption 2, d2 and d3 can be chosen as
d2 =
2diam(S)diam(A)|S|c1
dmin(A) (13)
and d3 =
diam(S)diam(A)c2
2 , respectively. Here dmin(A) = mina6=a′∈A ‖a− a′‖2, which is guaranteed to
be positive when A is finite.
4 RL Algorithms for (stationary) GMFGs
In this section, we design algorithms for the GMFG. Since the reward and transition distributions
are unknown, this is simultaneously learning the system and finding the NE of the game. We will
focus on the case with finite state and action spaces, i.e., |S|, |A| <∞. We will look for stationary
(time independent) NEs. This stationarity property enables developing appropriate stationary
reinforcement learning algorithms, suitable for an infinite time horizon game. Instead of knowing the
transition probability P and the reward r explicitly, the algorithms we propose only assume access
to a simulator oracle, which is described below, see [43, 51].
Simulator oracle. For any policy pi ∈ Π, given the current state s ∈ S, for any population
distribution L, one can obtain a sample of the next state s′ ∼ P (·|s, pi(s),L), a reward r =
r(s, pi(s),L), and the next population distribution L′ = Ps′,pi(s′). For brevity, we denote the simulator
as (s′, r,L′) = G(s, pi,L). This simulator oracle can be weakened to fit the N -player setting, see
Section 5.
In the following, we begin with a naive algorithm that simply combines the three-step fixed point
approach with general RL algorithms, and demonstrate that this algorithm can be unstable (§4.1).
We then propose some smoothing and projection techniques to resolve the issue (§4.2). In §4.3 and
§4.4, we design general value-based and policy-based RL algorithms, and establish the corresponding
convergence and complexity results. These two algorithms include most of the RL algorithms in the
literature. We then illustrate by two concrete examples based on Q-learning and trust-region policy
optimization algorithms.
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4.1 Naive algorithm and its issue
We follow the three-step fixed-point approach described in §3. Notice the fact that with L fixed,
Step A in §3 becomes a standard learning problem for an infinite horizon discounted MDP. More
specifically, the MDP to be solved isML = (S,A, PL, rL, γ), where PL(s′|s, a) = P (s′|s, a,L) and
rL(s, a) = r(s, a,L). Denote the optimal value function of the MDP as V ?M, and the optimal
Q-function as Q?M, and also use the shorthand V
?
L = V
?
ML and Q
?
L = Q
?
ML for notational brevity.
Similarly, denote V piM, Q
pi
M, V
pi
L and Q
pi
L for the value functions and Q-functions corresponding to a
specific policy pi.
Given the optimal Q-functionQ?L, one can obtain an optimal policy pi
?
L with pi
?
L(s) = argmax-e(Q
?
L(s, ·)).
Here the argmax-e operator is defined so that actions with equal maximum Q-values would have
equal probabilities to be selected. Hereafter, we specify Γ1 as a mapping to the aforementioned
choice of the optimal policy, i.e., the s-component Γ1(L)s = argmax-e(Q?L(s, ·)) for any s ∈ S.
The population update in Step B can then be directly obtained from the simulator G following
policy pi?L. Combining these two steps leads to the following naive algorithm (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Naive Reinforcement Learning for GMFGs
1: Input: Initial population state-action pair L0
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Obtain the optimal Q-function Qk(s, a) = Q?Lk(s, a) of an MDP with dynamics PLk(s
′|s, a)
and reward distributions RLk(s, a).
4: Compute pik ∈ Π with pik(s) = argmax-e (Qk(s, ·)).
5: Sample s ∼ µk, where µk is the population state marginal of Lk, and obtain Lk+1 from
G(s, pik,Lk).
6: end for
Unfortunately, in practice, one cannot obtain the exact optimal Q-function Qk. In fact, invoking
any commonly used RL algorithm with the simulator G leads to an approximation Qˆk of the actual
Qk. This approximation error is then magnified by the discontinuous and sensitive argmax-e,
which eventually leads to an unstable algorithm (see Figure 4 for an example of divergence). To
see why argmax-e is not continuous, consider the following simple example. Let x = (1, 1), then
argmax-e(x) = (1/2, 1/2). For any  > 0, let y = (1, 1− ), then argmax-e(y) = (1, 0). Hence
lim→0 y = x but
lim
→0
argmax-e(y) = argmax-e(x).
This instability issue will be addressed by introducing smoothing and projection techniques.
4.2 Restoring stability
Smoothing techniques. To address the instability caused, we replace argmax-e with a smooth
function that is a good approximation to argmax-e while being Lipschitz continuous. One such
candidate is the softmax operator softmaxc : Rn → Rn, with
softmaxc(x)i =
exp(cxi)∑n
j=1 exp(cxj)
, i = 1, . . . , n,
for some positive constant c. The resulting policies are sometimes called Boltzmann policies, and are
widely used in the literature of reinforcement learning [4, 23].
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The softmax operator can be generalized to a wide class of operators. In fact, for positive
constants c, c′ > 0, one can consider a parametrized family Fc,c′ ⊆ {fc,c′ : Rn → Rn} of all
“smoothed” argmax-e’s, i.e., all fc,c′ : Rn → Rn that satisfies the following two conditions:
• Condition 1: fc,c′ is c-Lipschitz, i.e., ‖fc,c′(x)− fc,c′(y)‖2 ≤ c‖x− y‖2.
• Condition 2: fc,c′ is a good approximation of argmax-e, i.e.,
‖fc,c′(x)− argmax-e(x)‖2 ≤ 2n exp(−c′δ),
where δ = xmax −maxxj<xmax xj , xmax = maxi=1,...,n xi, and δ :=∞ when all xj are equal.
Notice that Fc,c′ is closed under convex combinations, i.e., if fc,c′ , gc,c′ ∈ Fc,c′ , then for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
λfc,c′ + (1− λ)gc,c‘ also satisfies the two conditions. Hence Fc,c′ is convex.
To have a better idea of what Fc,c′ looks like, we describe a subset Bc,c′ of Fc,c′ consisting of the
generalized softmax operator softmaxh : Rn → Rn, defined as
softmaxh(x)i =
exp(h(xi))∑n
j=1 exp(h(xj))
, i = 1, . . . , n, (14)
where h : R→ R satisfies c′(x− y) ≤ h(x)− h(y) ≤ c(x− y) for any x ≥ y. When h is continuously
differentiable, a sufficient condition is that c′ ≤ h′(x) ≤ c. In particular, if h(x) ≡ cx for some
constant c > 0, the operator reduces to the classical softmax operator, in which case we overload the
notation to write softmaxh as softmaxc.
This operator is Lipschitz continuous and close to the argmax-e (see Lemmas 12 and 13 in the
Appendix), and in particular one can show that Bc,c′ ⊆ Fc,c′ . As a result, even though smoothed
(e.g., Boltzmann) policies are not optimal, the difference between the smoothed and the optimal
one can always be controlled by choosing a function h with appropriate parameters c, c′. Note that
other smoothing operators (e.g., Mellowmax [4], which is a softmax operator with time-varying and
problem dependent temperatures) may also be considered.
Error control in updating L. Given the sub-optimality of the smoothed policy, one needs to
characterize the difference between the optimal policy and the non-optimal ones. In particular, one
can define the action gap between the best and the second best actions in terms of the Q-value as
δs(L) := max
a′∈A
Q?L(s, a
′)− max
a/∈argmaxa∈AQ?L(s,a)
Q?L(s, a) > 0.
Action gap is important for approximation algorithms [5], and is closely related to the problem-
dependent bounds for regret analysis in reinforcement learning and multi-armed bandits, and
advantage learning algorithms including A3C [39].
The problem is: in order for the learning algorithm to converge in terms of L (Theorems 3 and
8), one needs to ensure a definite differentiation between the optimal policy and the sub-optimal
ones. This is problematic as the infimum of δs(L) over an infinite number of L can be 0. To address
this, the population distribution at step k, say Lk, needs to be projected to a finite grid, called -net.
The relation between the -net and action gaps is as follows:
For any  > 0, there exist a positive function φ() and an -net S := {L(1), . . . ,L(N)} ⊆
P(S × A), with the properties that mini=1,...,N dTV (L,L(i)) ≤  for any L ∈ P(S × A), and that
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maxa′∈AQ?L(i)(s, a
′)−Q?L(i)(s, a) ≥ φ() for any i = 1, . . . , N, s ∈ S, and any a /∈ argmaxa∈AQ?L(i)(s, a).
Here the existence of -nets is trivial due to the compactness of the probability simplex P(S ×A),
and the existence of φ() comes from the finiteness of the action set A.
In practice, φ() often takes the form of Dα with D > 0 and the exponent α > 0 characterizing
the decay rate of the action gaps. In general, experiments are robust with respect to the choice of
-net.
In the next two sections, we propose value based and policy based algorithms for learning GMFG.
4.3 Value-based algorithms
We start by introducing the following definition.
Definition 4.1 (Value-based Guarantee). For an arbitrary MDP M, we say that an algorithm
has a value-based guarantee with parameters {C(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }mi=1, if for any , δ > 0, after
obtaining
TM(, δ) =
m∑
i=1
C
(i)
M
(
1

)α(i)1 (
log
1

)α(i)2 (1
δ
)α(i)3 (
log
1
δ
)α(i)4
(15)
samples from the simulator oracle G, with probability at least 1− 2δ, it outputs an approximate
Q-function QˆTM(,δ) which satisfies ‖QˆTM(,δ) − Q?‖∞ ≤ . Here the norm ‖ · ‖∞ is understood
element-wisely.
4.3.1 GMF-V
We now state the first main algorithm (Algorithm 2). It applies to any algorithm Alg with a
value-based guarantee.
Algorithm 2 GMF-V(Alg, fc,c′)
1: Input: Initial L0, -net S, temperatures c, c′ > 0, tolerances k, δk > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . .
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Apply Alg to find the approximate Q-function Qˆ?k = Qˆ
Tk of the MDPMLk , where Tk =
TMLk (k, δk).
4: Compute pik(s) = fc,c′(Qˆ?k(s, ·)).
5: Sample s ∼ µk (µk is the population state marginal of Lk), obtain L˜k+1 from G(s, pik,Lk).
6: Find Lk+1 = ProjS(L˜k+1)
7: end for
Here ProjS(L) = argminL(1),...,L(N)dTV (L(i),L). For computational tractability, it is sufficient
to choose S as a truncation grid so that projection of L˜k onto the -net reduces to truncating L˜k to
a certain number of digits. For instance, in experiments in §7, the number of digits is chosen to be
4. Appropriate choices of the hyper-parameters c, c′,  and tolerances k, δk (k ≥ 0) are given in
Theorems 3. Our experiment shows the algorithm is robust with respect to these hyper-parameters.
In the special case when the rewards rL and transition dynamics PL are known, one can for
example replace the Alg step in the above Algorithm 2 by value iteration, resulting in GMF-VI
(Algorithm 8) in Appendix C.
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We next establish the convergence of the above GMF-V algorithm to an approximate Nash
equilibrium of (GMFG), with complexity analysis.
Theorem 3 (Convergence and complexity of GMF-V). Assume the same assumptions as Theorem
1. Suppose that Alg has a value-based guarantee with parameters
{C(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }mi=1.
For any , δ > 0, set δk = δ/K,η, k = (k + 1)−(1+η) for some η ∈ (0, 1] (k = 0, . . . ,K,η − 1), and
c′ = c = log(1/)φ() .
2 Then with probability at least 1− 2δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤ C0.
Here K,η :=
⌈
2 max
{
(η/c)−1/η, logd(/max{diam(S)diam(A), c}) + 1
}⌉
is the number of outer
iterations, and the constant C0 is independent of δ,  and η.
Moreover, the total number of samples T =
∑K,η−1
k=0 TMLk (δk, k) is bounded by
T ≤
m∑
i=1
2α
(i)
2
2α
(i)
1 + 1
C
(i)
MK
2α
(i)
1 +1
,η (K,η/δ)
α
(i)
3 (log(K,η/δ))
α
(i)
2 +α
(i)
4 . (16)
The proof of Theorem 3 (in the Appendix) depends on the Lipschitz continuity of the smoothing
operator fc,c′ , the closeness between fc,c′ and the argmax-e (Lemma 13 in the Appendix), and the
complexity of Alg provided by the value-based guarantee.
4.3.2 GMF-V-Q: GMF-V with Q-learning
As an example of the GMF-V algorithm, we describe algorithm GMF-V-Q, a Q-learning based
GMF-V algorithm.
For an MDPM = (S,A, P, r, γ), the Q-learning algorithm approximates the value iteration by
stochastic approximation. At each step l with the state s and an action a, the system reaches state
s′ according to the controlled dynamics and the Q-function approximation Ql is updated according
to
Ql+1(s, a)← (1− βl(s, a))Ql(s, a) + βl(s, a)
[
r(s, a) + γmax
a¯
Ql(s
′, a¯)
]
, (17)
where the step size βl(s, a) can be chosen as ([13])
βl(s, a) =
{
|#(s, a, l) + 1|−h, (s, a) = (sl, al),
0, otherwise.
(18)
with h ∈ (1/2, 1). Here #(s, a, l) is the number of times up to time l that one visits the state-
action pair (s, a). The algorithm then proceeds to choose action a′ based on Ql+1 with appropriate
exploration strategies, including the -greedy strategy.
The validity of GMF-V-Q is ensured by the following value-based guarantee for Q-learning.
2Here we actually only need c′ = Ω( log(1/)
φ()
) and c = O( log(1/)
φ()
), and the corresponding result will differ only in
some absolute constants.
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Proposition 4 (Value-based guarantee of Q-learning algorithm). The Q-learning algorithm with
appropriate choices of step-sizes (cf. (18)) satisfies the value-based guarantee with the following
parameters (cf. Lemma 5 below for detailed specifications of the hyper-parameters L, Vmax, h, β and
p):
C
(1)
M = C1 ·
2h/(1−h)L1/(1−h)(log Vmax)1/(1−h)
β1/(1−h)(log 1p)
1/(1−h) , α
(1)
4 =
1
1− h, α
(1)
j = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,
C
(2)
M = C2 ·
2h/(1−h)L1/(1−h)
β1/(1−h)(log 1p)
1/(1−h) , α
(2)
2 = α
(2)
4 =
1
1− h, α
(2)
1 = α
(2)
3 = 0,
C
(3)
M = C3 ·
31/hL(1+3h)/hV
2/h
max(log
|S||A|Vmax
β )
1/h
(log 1p)
(1+3h)/hβ2/h
, α
(3)
1 =
2
h
, α
(3)
4 =
1 + 3h
h
, α
(3)
j = 0 for j = 2, 3,
C
(4)
M = C4 ·
31/hL(1+3h)/hV
2/h
max
(log 1p)
(1+3h)/hβ2/h
, α
(4)
1 =
2
h
, α
(4)
4 =
2 + 3h
h
, α
(4)
j = 0 for j = 2, 3,
C
(5)
M = C5 ·
31/hL(1+3h)/hV
2/h
max
(log 1p)
(1+3h)/hβ2/h
, α
(5)
1 =
2
h
, α
(5)
2 =
1
h
, α
(5)
4 =
1 + 3h
h
, α
(5)
3 = 0.
The corresponding Q-learning based algorithm with the standard softmax operator is GMF-V-Q
(Algorithm 3), which will be used in the experiment (§7).
Algorithm 3 Q-learning for GMFGs (GMF-V-Q)
1: Input: Initial L0, -net S, tolerances k, δk > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . .
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Perform Q-learning with hyper-parameters in Lemma 5 for Tk = TMLk (k, δk) iterations to
find the approximate Q-function Qˆ?k = Qˆ
Tk of the MDPMLk .
4: Compute pik ∈ Π with pik(s) = softmaxc(Qˆ?k(s, ·)).
5: Sample s ∼ µk (µk is the population state marginal of Lk), obtain L˜k+1 from G(s, pik,Lk).
6: Find Lk+1 = ProjS(L˜k+1)
7: end for
The value-based guarantee of Q-learning in Proposition 4 can be obtained from the following
sample complexity result.
Lemma 5 ([13]: sample complexity of Q-learning). For an MDP, sayM = (S,A, P, r, γ), suppose
that the Q-learning algorithm takes step-sizes (18). Also suppose that the covering time of the
state-action pairs is bounded by L with probability at least 1−p for some p ∈ (0, 1). Then ‖QˆTM(δ,)−
Q?‖∞ ≤  with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Here QˆT is the T -th update in Q-learning, Q? is the
(optimal) Q-function, and
TM(δ,) = Ω
(L logp(δ)
β
log
Vmax

) 1
1−h
+
(L logp(δ))1+3h V 2max log
( |S||A|Vmax
δβ
)
β22

1
h
 ,
where β = (1− γ)/2, Vmax = Rmax/(1− γ), and Rmax is such that a.s. 0 ≤ r(s, a) ≤ Rmax.
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Here the covering time L of a state-action pair sequence is defined to be the number of steps
needed to visit all state-action pairs starting from any arbitrary state-action pair. Also notice
that the l∞ norm above is defined in an element-wise sense, i.e., for M ∈ R|S|×|A|, we have
‖M‖∞ = maxs∈S,a∈A |M(s, a)|.
Corollary 6. Assume the same assumptions as Theorem 1, Q-learning satisfies the condition in
Theorem 3, implying in the convergence of algorithm GMF-V-Q.
4.4 Policy-based algorithms
In addition to algorithms with value-based guarantees (cf. Definition 4.1), there are also numerous
algorithms with policy-based guarantees, defined below.
Definition 4.2 (Policy-based Guarantee). For an arbitrary MDP M, we say that an algorithm
has a policy-based guarantee with parameters {C(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }mi=1, if for any , δ > 0, after
obtaining
TM(, δ) =
m∑
i=1
C
(i)
M
(
1

)α(i)1 (
log
1

)α(i)2 (1
δ
)α(i)3 (
log
1
δ
)α(i)4
(19)
samples from the simulator oracle G, with probability at least 1− 2δ, it outputs an approximate
policy piTM(,δ), which satisfies V
?
M(s)− V
piTM(,δ)
M (s) ≤ , ∀ s ∈ S.
4.4.1 GMF-P
Before we present the policy-based RL algorithms, we first make a connection between policy-based
and value-based guarantees.
For any policy pi ∈ Π, define
QˆpiM,M,l(s, a) :=
1
M
M∑
i=1
(
ri + γVˆ
pi
M,l(s
′
i)
)
, ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A, (20)
where ri ∼ r(s, a), s′i ∼ P (·|s, a) are i.i.d. (i = 1, . . . ,m), and Vˆ piM,l(s′i) are the discounted total
rewards of independent trajectories starting from s′i truncated at the l-th step, following policy pi.
We have the following lemma (the proof is in the appendix).
Lemma 7. Suppose that the algorithm Alg satisfies a policy-based guarantee with parameters
{C(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }mi=1. Then for QˆpiM,M,l defined in (20), we have
P
(∥∥∥QˆpiTM(,δ)M,M,l −Q?M∥∥∥∞ > ) ≤ 2δ (21)
for l =
⌈
logγ
(1−γ)
2C
⌉
and M =
⌈
2C2
(1−γ)4
1
2
log 2δ
⌉
. Consequently, the algorithm Alg also has a value-
based guarantee with parameters {C˜(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }m+1i=1 , where C˜(i)M is some constant multiple
of C(i)M (i = 1, . . . ,m), C˜
(m+1)
M is a constant depending on C˜, γ, and α
(m+1)
1 = 2, α
(m+1)
2 = 1,
α
(m+1)
3 = 0 and α
(m+1)
4 = 1.
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Algorithm 4 GMF-P(Alg, fc,c′)
1: Input: Initial L0, -net S, temperatures c, c′ > 0, tolerances k, δk > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . .
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Apply Alg to find the approximate policy pˆik = piTk of the MDP Mk := MLk , where
Tk = TMk(k/2, δk/2).
4: Compute QˆpˆikMk,Mk,lk (cf. (20)) by sampling Mk =
⌈
2C2
(1−γ)4
1
2k
log 2δk
⌉
i.i.d. sample trajectories
truncated at step lk =
⌈
logγ
(1−γ)k
2C
⌉
.
5: Compute pik(s) = fc,c′(Qˆ
pˆik
Mk,Mk,lk(s, ·)).
6: Sample s ∼ µk (µk is the population state marginal of Lk), obtain L˜k+1 from G(s, pik,Lk).
7: Find Lk+1 = ProjS(L˜k+1)
8: end for
The above lemma indicates that any algorithm with a policy-based guarantee also satisfies a
value-based guarantee with similar parameters. The policy-based algorithm GMF-P (Algorithm 4)
makes use of Lemma 7 to select hyper-parameters M and l so that the resulting Qˆ
piTM(,δ)
M,M,l forms a
good value-based certificate.
We next show the convergence result for the GMF-P algorithm. The proof follows by combining
the proof of Lemma 7 with the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 8 (Convergence and complexity of GMF-P). Assume the same assumptions as in Theorem
1. Suppose that Alg has a policy-based guarantee with parameters
{C(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }mi=1.
Then for any , δ > 0, set δk = δ/K,η, k = (k + 1)−(1+η) for some η ∈ (0, 1] (k = 0, . . . ,K,η − 1),
and c′ = c = log(1/)φ() ,
3 with probability at least 1− 2δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤ C0.
Here K,η :=
⌈
2 max
{
(η/c)−1/η, logd(/max{diam(S)diam(A), c}) + 1
}⌉
is the number of outer
iterations, and the constant C0 is independent of δ,  and η.
Moreover, the total number of samples T =
∑K,η−1
k=0 TMLk (δk, k) is bounded by
T ≤
m+1∑
i=1
2α
(i)
2
2α
(i)
1 + 1
C˜
(i)
MK
2α
(i)
1 +1
,η (K,η/δ)
α
(i)
3 (log(K,η/δ))
α
(i)
2 +α
(i)
4 , (22)
where the parameters {C˜(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }m+1i=1 are defined in Lemma 7.
3Here again we actually only need c′ = Ω( log(1/)
φ()
) and c = O( log(1/)
φ()
), and the corresponding result will differ only
in some absolute constants.
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4.4.2 GMF-P-TRPO: GMF-P with TRPO
A special form of the GMF-P algorithm utilizes the trust region policy optimization (TRPO)
algorithm [46, 47]. We call it GMF-P-TRPO.
Sample-based TRPO [47] assumes access to a ν-restart model. That is, it can only access
sampled trajectories and restarts according to the distribution ν. Here we pick ν such that
Cpi
∗
:=
∥∥∥∥dpi∗UnifSν ∥∥∥∥
∞
= maxs∈S
∣∣∣∣dpi∗UnifS (s)ν(s) ∣∣∣∣ < ∞, where dpiρ = (1 − γ)ρ(I − γP pi)−1 and UnifS is
the uniform distribution on set S. Sample-based TRPO samples M0 trajectories per episode.
The initial state s0 at the beginning of each episode is sampled from ν. In every trajectory m
(m = 1, 2, · · · ,M0) of the l-th episode, it first samples sm ∼ dpilν and takes an action am ∼ UnifA
where UnifA is the uniform distribution on the set A. Then, by following the current pil, it estimates
Qpil(sm, am) using a rollout. Denote this estimate as Qˆpil(sm, am,m) and observe that it is (nearly)
an unbiased estimator of Qpil(sm, am). We assume that each rollout runs sufficiently long so that
the bias is sufficiently small. Sample-Based TRPO updates the policy at the end of the l-th episode,
by the following proximal problem
pil+1 ∈ arg min
pi∈∆|S|A
{
1
M0
M0∑
m=1
1
tl(1− γ)Bw(sm;pi, pil) + 〈∇ˆV
pil [m], pi(sm)− pil(sm)〉
}
,
where the estimation of the gradient is
∇ˆV pil [m] := 1
1− γ |A|Qˆ
pil(sm, ·,m) ◦ I{·=am}.
Given two policies pi1 and pi2, we denote their Bregman distance associated with a strongly convex
function w as Bw(s;pi1, pi2) = Bw(pi1(s), pi2(s)), where Bw(x, y) := w(x) − w(y) − 〈∇w(y), x − y〉
and pii(s) ∈ P (A) (i = 1, 2). Denote Bw(pi1, pi2) ∈ R|S| as the corresponding state-wise vector. Here
we consider two common cases for w: when w(x) = 12‖x‖22 is the Euclidean distance, Bw(x, y) =
1
2‖x−y‖22; when w(x) = H(x) is the negative entropy, Bw(x, y) = dKL(x||y). We refer to [47, Section
6.2] for more detailed discussion on Sample-based TRPO.
To validate GMF-P-TRPO, we first see that TRPO algorithm satisfies the following policy-based
guarantee.
Proposition 9 (Policy-based guarantee of TRPO). Let tl =
(1−γ)
Cω,1C
√
l+1
, then TRPO algorithm
satisfies the policy-based guarantee with the following parameters:
C
(1)
M = C1 ·
C
1/2
ω,1C
3/2|A|2 log |A|(Cpi∗)2
|S|3/2(1− γ)7 , α
(1)
1 = 5/2, α
(1)
j = 0 for j = 2, 3, 4,
C
(2)
M = C2 ·
C
1/2
ω,1C
3/2|A|2(Cpi∗)2
|S|5/2(1− γ)7 , α
(2)
1 = 5/2, α
(2)
4 = 1, α
(2)
2 = α
(2)
3 = 0.
Here C > 0 is the upper bound on the reward function r, Cw,1 =
√|A| in the euclidean case
and Cw,1 = 1 in the non-euclidean case, Cw,2 = 1 for the euclidean case and Cw,2 = |A|2 for the
non-euclidean case.
The above guarantee follows from the sample complexity result below by specifying µ := UnifS .
Notice that here for any µ ∈ P(S), we define V ?(µ) := ∑s∈S µ(s)V ?(s), and similarly V pik(µ) :=∑
s∈S µ(s)V
pik(s).
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Lemma 10 (Theorem 5 in [47]: sample complexity of TRPO). Let {pil}l≥0 be the sequence generated
by Sample-Based TRPO, using
M0 ≥ Ω( |A|
2C2(|S| log |A|+ log 1/δ)
(1− γ)22 )
samples in each episode, with tl =
(1−γ)
Cω,1C
√
l+1
. Let {V Nbest}N≥0 be the sequence of best achieved values,
V Nbest(µ) := maxl=0,1,··· ,N V
pil(µ), where µ ∈ P(S). Then with probability greater than 1− δ for every
 > 0, the following holds for all N ≥ 1:
V ∗(µ)− V Nbest(µ) ≤ O
(
Cω,1C
(1− γ)2√N +
Cpi
∗

(1− γ)2
)
.
Note that [47, Theorem 5] has both regularized version and unregularized version of TRPO.
Here we only adopt the unregularized version which fits the framework of Algorithm 4. For more
materials on regularized MDPs and reinforcement learning, we refer the readers to [40, 16, 11].
Corollary 11. Assume the same assumptions as Theorem 1, TRPO algorithm satisfies the condition
in Theorem 8, implying the convergence of algorithm GMF-P-TRPO.
5 Applications to N-player Games
In this section, we discuss a potential application of our modeling and approach to N -player settings.
To this end, we consider extensions of Algorithms 2 and 4 with weaker assumptions on the simulator
access. In particular, we weaken the simulator oracle assumption in §4 as follows.
Weak simulator oracle. For each player i, given any policy pi ∈ Π, the current state si ∈ S, for
any empirical population state-action distribution LN , one can obtain a sample of the next state
s′i ∼ PLN (·|si, pi(si)) = P (·|si, pi(si),LN ) and a reward r = rLN (si, pi(si)) = r(si, pi(si),LN ). For
brevity, we denote the simulator as (s′i, r) = GW (si, pi,LN ).
We say that LN is an empirical population state-action distribution of N -players if for each
s ∈ S, a ∈ A, LN (s, a) = 1N
∑N
i=1 Isi=s,ai=a for some state-action profile of {si, ai}Ni=1. Equivalently,
this holds if NLN (s, a) is a non-negative integer for each s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and
∑
s,a LN (s, a) = 1. We
denote the set of empirical population state-action distributions as EmpN .
RL algorithms with access only to GW . Compared to the original simulator oracle G, the weak
simulator GW only accepts empirical population state-action distributions as inputs, and does not
directly output the next (empirical) population state-action distribution.
To make use of the simulator GW , we modify Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 4 to algorithms
(Algorithms 5 and 6). In particular, see Step 6 in Algorithm 5 and Step 7 in Algorithm 6 for
generating empirical distributions from simulator GW .
One can observe that EmpN already serves as an 1/N -net. So one can directly use it without
additional projections. The definition of Lk also makes sure that Lk ∈ EmpN as required for the
input of the weaker simulator.
Convergence results similar to Theorems 3 and 8 can be obtained for Algorithms 5 and 6,
respectively. (See Appendix B.) Here the major difference is an additional O(1/
√
N) term in the
16
Algorithm 5 GMF-VW(Alg, fc,c′): weak simulator
1: Input: Initial L0, temperatures c, c′ > 0, tolerances k, δk > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . .
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Apply Alg to find the approximate Q-function Qˆ?k = Qˆ
Tk of the MDPMLk , where Tk =
TMLk (k, δk).
4: Compute pik(s) = fc,c′(Qˆ?k(s, ·)).
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N do
6: Sample si
i.i.d.∼ µk, then obtain s′i i.i.d. from GW (si, pik,Lk) and a′i i.i.d.∼ pik(s′i).
end for
Compute Lk+1 with Lk+1(s, a) = 1N
∑N
i=1 Is′i=s,a′i=a.
9: end for
Algorithm 6 GMF-PW(Alg, fc,c′): weak simulator
1: Input: Initial L0, temperatures c, c′ > 0, tolerances k, δk > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . .
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Apply Alg to find the approximate policy pˆik = piTk of the MDP Mk := MLk , where
Tk = TMLk (k/2, δk/2).
4: Compute QˆpˆikMk,Mk,lk (cf. (20)) by sampling Mk =
⌈
2C2
(1−γ)4
1
2k
log 2δk
⌉
i.i.d. sample trajectories
truncated at step lk =
⌈
logγ
(1−γ)k
2C
⌉
.
5: Compute pik(s) = fc,c′(Qˆ
pˆik
Mk,Mk,lk(s, ·)).
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N do
7: Sample si
i.i.d.∼ µk, then obtain s′i i.i.d. from GW (si, pik,Lk) and a′i i.i.d.∼ pik(s′i).
end for
Compute Lk+1 with Lk+1(s, a) = 1N
∑N
i=1 Is′i=s,a′i=a.
10: end for
finite step error bound. It is worth mentioning that O(1/
√
N) is consistent with the literature on
MFG approximation errors of finite N -player games [28].
6 Proof of the main results
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2
In this section, we provide the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 2] We begin by noticing that L′ = Γ2(pi,L) can be expanded and computed
as follows:
µ′(s′) =
∑
s∈S,a∈A µ(s)P (s
′|s, a,L)pi(s, a), L′(s′, a′) = µ′(s′)pi(s′, a′), (23)
where µ is the state marginal distribution of L.
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Now by the inequalities (50), we have
W1(Γ2(pi1,L),Γ2(pi2,L)) ≤ diam(S ×A)dTV (Γ2(pi1,L),Γ2(pi2,L))
=
diam(S ×A)
2
∑
s′∈S,a′∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s∈S,a∈A
µ(s)P (s′|s, a,L) (pi1(s, a)pi1(s′, a′)− pi2(s, a)pi2(s′, a′))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤diam(S ×A)
2
max
s,a,L,s′
P (s′|s, a,L)
∑
s,a,s′,a′
µ(s)(pi1(s, a) + pi2(s, a))|pi1(s′, a′)− pi2(s′, a′)|
≤diam(S ×A)
2
max
s,a,L,s′
P (s′|s, a,L)
∑
s′,a′
|pi1(s′, a′)− pi2(s′, a′)| · (1 + 1)
=2diam(S ×A) max
s,a,L,s′
P (s′|s, a,L)
∑
s′
dTV (pi1(s
′), pi2(s′))
≤2diam(S ×A) maxs,a,L,s′ P (s
′|s, a,L)|S|
dmin(A) D(pi1, pi2) =
2diam(S)diam(A)|S|c1
dmin(A) D(pi1, pi2).
(24)
Similarly, we have
W1(Γ2(pi,L1),Γ2(pi,L2)) ≤ diam(S ×A)dTV (Γ2(pi,L1),Γ2(pi,L2))
=
diam(S ×A)
2
∑
s′∈S,a′∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s∈S,a∈A
µ(s)pi(s, a)pi(s′, a′)
(
P (s′|s, a,L1)− P (s′|s, a,L2)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤diam(S ×A)
2
∑
s,a,s′,a′
µ(s)pi(s, a)pi(s′, a′)
∣∣P (s′|s, a,L1)− P (s′|s, a,L2)∣∣
≤diam(S)diam(A)c2
2
.
(25)
This completes the proof.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 7
In this section, we provide the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 7] For notation simplicity, in the following analysis we fix the MDP and
omit the the notationM. First, notice that if V ?(s′)− V piT (,δ)(s′) ≤ , then
|QpiT (,δ)(s, a)−Q?(s, a)| = γ
∣∣∣∣∣∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V piT (,δ)(s′)−
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V ?(s′)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a) ∣∣V piT (,δ)(s′)− V ?(s′)∣∣ ≤ γ < . (26)
for any s ∈ S, a ∈ A.
Let’s now fix an arbitrary pair of , δ > 0. Since we have assumed that r is almost surely
uniformly bounded by some constant C > 0. Hence 0 ≤ Vˆ piT (,δ)l (s′i) ≤ C/(1− γ). And if we define
Xi := ri + γVˆ
piT (,δ)
l (s
′
i), then Xi’s are independent and almost surely bounded by C˜ := C/(1− γ).
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Below we use the shorthand QˆM,l = Qˆ
piT (,δ)
M,l for notational convenience. By the Hoeffding inequality,
we have
P
(∣∣∣QˆM,l(s, a)− E [QˆM,l(s, a)]∣∣∣ ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp(−2Mt2/C˜2) . (27)
Now notice that
E
[
QˆM,l(s, a)
]
= E[r(s, a)] + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V piT (,δ)l (s′), (28)
where
V
piT (,δ)
l (s
′) = E
[
l∑
t=0
γtr(st, at)
∣∣∣s0 = s′, at ∼ piTM(,δ)(st), st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at), ∀ t ≥ 0
]
.
Also notice that for any s′ ∈ S,∣∣∣V piT (,δ)l (s′)− V piT (,δ)(s′)∣∣∣ ≤ Cγl+1/(1− γ). (29)
Combining (28) and (29), we have∣∣∣E [QˆM,l(s, a)]−QpiT (,δ)∣∣∣ ≤ Cγl+2/(1− γ). (30)
Since we have assumed that Alg satisfies a policy-based guarantee, for any , δ > 0, after obtaining
T (/2, δ/2) samples, we have
P
(
V ?(s′)− V piT (,δ)(s′) > /2) ≤ δ, (31)
which, combined with (26), leads to
P
(∥∥∥QˆM,l −Q?∥∥∥∞ > γ/2 + Cγl+2/(1− γ) + t) ≤ 2 exp(−2Mt2/C˜2)+ δ. (32)
Finally, we take l =
⌈
logγ
(1−γ)
2C
⌉
andM =
⌈
2C˜2
(1−γ)2
1
2
log 2δ
⌉
, (32) becomes P
(∥∥∥QˆM,l −Q?∥∥∥∞ > ) ≤
2δ. And noticing that the computation of QˆM,l requires an additional M(l + 2) number of samples,
we conclude that Alg also has a value-based guarantee with parameters
{C˜(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }m+1i=1 , (33)
with the parameters as specified in the claim of the lemma. This completes our proof.
6.3 Proof of Theorems 3 and 8
The proofs of Theorems 3 and 8 rely on the following lemmas.
Lemma 12. Suppose that h : R→ R satisfies c′(a− b) ≤ h(a)− h(b) ≤ c(a− b) for any a ≥ b ∈ R.
Then the softmax function softmaxh is c-Lipschitz, i.e., ‖softmaxh(x)−softmaxh(y)‖2 ≤ c‖x−y‖2
for any x, y ∈ Rn.
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Proof. [Proof of Lemma 12] Notice that softmaxh(x) = softmax(h˜(x)), where
softmax(x)i =
exp(xi)∑n
j=1 exp(xj)
(i = 1, . . . , n)
is the standard softmax function and h˜(x)i = h(xi) for i = 1, . . . , n. Now since softmax is 1-
Lipschitz continuous (cf. [15, Proposition 4]), and h˜ is c-Lipschitz continuous, we conclude that the
composition softmax ◦ h˜ is c-Lipschitz continuous.
Notice that for a finite set X ⊆ Rk and any two (discrete) distributions ν, ν ′ over X , we have
W1(ν, ν
′) ≤ diam(X )dTV (ν, ν ′) = diam(X )
2
‖ν − ν ′‖1 ≤ diam(X )
√|X |
2
‖ν − ν ′‖2, (34)
where in computing the `1-norm, ν, ν ′ are viewed as vectors of length |X |.
Lemma 12 implies that for any x, y ∈ R|X |, when softmaxc(x) and softmaxc(y) are viewed as
probability distributions over X , we have
W1(softmaxc(x), softmaxc(y)) ≤ diam(X )
√|X |c
2
‖x− y‖2 ≤ diam(X )|X |c
2
‖x− y‖∞.
Lemma 13. Suppose that h : R→ R satisfies c′(a− b) ≤ h(a)− h(b) ≤ c(a− b) for any x ≤ y ∈ R.
Then the distance between the softmaxh and the argmax-e mapping is bounded by
‖softmaxh(x)− argmax-e(x)‖2 ≤ 2n exp(−c′δ),
where δ = xmax −maxxj<xmax xj, xmax = maxi=1,...,n xi, and δ :=∞ when all xj are equal.
Similar to Lemma 12, Lemma 13 implies that for any x ∈ R|X |, viewing softmaxh(x) as
probability distributions over X leads to
W1(softmaxh(x),argmax-e(x)) ≤ diam(X )|X | exp(−cδ).
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 13] Without loss of generality, assume that x1 = x2 = · · · = xm =
maxi=1,...,n xi = x
? > xj for all m < j ≤ n. Then
argmax-e(x)i =
{
1
m , i ≤ m,
0, otherwise.
softmaxh(x)i =

eh(x
?)
meh(x
?)+
∑n
j=m+1 e
h(xj)
, i ≤ m,
eh(xi)
meh(x
?)+
∑n
j=m+1 e
h(xj)
, otherwise.
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Therefore
‖softmaxh(x)− argmax-e(x)‖2 ≤ ‖softmaxh(x)− argmax-e(x)‖1
=m
(
1
m
− e
h(x?)
meh(x?) +
∑n
j=m+1 e
h(xj)
)
+
∑n
i=m+1 e
h(xi)
meh(x?) +
∑n
j=m+1 e
h(xj)
=
2
∑n
i=m+1 e
h(xi)
meh(x?) +
∑n
i=m+1 e
h(xi)
=
2
∑n
i=m+1 e
−c′δi
m+
∑n
i=m+1 e
−cδi
≤ 2
m
n∑
i=m+1
e−c
′δi ≤ 2(n−m)
m
e−c
′δ ≤ 2ne−c′δ,
with δi = x? − xi.
We are now ready to present the proofs of Theorems 3 and 8.
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 3] Here we prove the case when we are using GMF-V and Alg has a value-
based guarantee. Define Γˆk1(Lk) := softmaxfc,c′
(
Qˆ?k
)
. In the following, pi = softmaxfc,c′ (QL) is
understood as the policy pi with pi(s) = softmaxfc,c′ (QL(s, ·)). Let L? be the population state-action
pair in a stationary NE of (GMFG). Then pik = Γˆk1(Lk). Denoting d := d1d2 + d3, we see
W1(L˜k+1,L?) = W1(Γ2(pik,Lk),Γ2(Γ1(L?),L?))
≤W1(Γ2(Γ1(Lk),Lk),Γ2(Γ1(L?),L?)) +W1(Γ2(Γ1(Lk),Lk),Γ2(Γˆk1(Lk),Lk))
≤W1(Γ(Lk),Γ(L?)) + d2D(Γ1(Lk), Γˆk1(Lk))
≤(d1d2 + d3)W1(Lk,L?) + d2D(argmax-e(Q?Lk), softmaxfc,c′ (Qˆ?k))
≤dW1(Lk,L?) + d2D(softmaxfc,c′ (Qˆ?k), softmaxfc,c′ (Q?Lk))
+ d2D(argmax-e(Q?Lk), softmaxfc,c′ (Q
?
Lk))
≤dW1(Lk,L?) + cd2diam(A)|A|
2
‖Qˆ?k −Q?Lk‖∞ + d2D(argmax-e(Q?Lk), softmaxfc,c′ (Q?Lk)).
Since Lk ∈ S by the projection step, by Lemma 13 and the algorithm Alg has a policy-based
guarantee, with the choice of Tk = TMLk (δk, k)), we have, with probability at least 1− 2δk,
W1(L˜k+1,L?) ≤ dW1(Lk,L?) + cd2diam(A)|A|
2
k + d2diam(A)|A|e−cφ(). (35)
Finally, with probability at least 1− 2δk,
W1(Lk+1,L?) ≤W1(L˜k+1,L?) +W1(L˜k+1,ProjS(L˜k+1))
≤ dW1(Lk,L?) + cd2diam(A)|A|
2
k + d2diam(A)|A|e−cφ() + .
This implies that with probability at least 1− 2∑K−1k=0 δk,
W1(LK ,L?) ≤dKW1(L0,L?) + cd2diam(A)|A|
2
K−1∑
k=0
dK−kk
+
(d2diam(A)|A|e−cφ() + )(1− dK)
1− d .
(36)
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Since k is summable, we have supk≥0 k <∞,
K−1∑
k=0
dK−kk ≤
supk≥0 k
1− d d
b(K−1)/2c +
∞∑
k=d(K−1)/2e
k.
Now plugging in K = K,η, with the choice of δk and c =
log(1/)
φ() , and noticing that d ∈ [0, 1), we
have with probability at least 1− 2δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤dK,ηW1(L0,L?)
+
cd2diam(A)|A|
2
supk≥0 k
1− d d
b(K,η−1)/2c +
∞∑
k=d(K,η−1)/2e
k

+
(d2diam(A)|A|+ 1)
1− d .
(37)
Setting k = (k + 1)−(1+η), then when K,η ≥ 2(logd(/c) + 1),
supk≥0 k
1− d d
b(K,η−1)/2c ≤ /c
1− d.
Similarly, when K,η ≥ 2(η/c)−1/η,
∞∑
k=
⌈
K,η−1
2
⌉ k ≤ /c.
Finally, whenK,η ≥ logd(/(diam(S)diam(A))), dK,ηW1(L0,L?) ≤ , sinceW1(L0,L?) ≤ diam(S×
A)= diam(S)diam(A).
In summary, if K,η = d2 max{(η/c)−1/η, logd(/max{diam(S)diam(A), c}) + 1}e, then with
probability at least 1− 2δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤
(
1 +
d2diam(A)|A|(2− d)
2(1− d) +
(d2diam(A)|A|+ 1)
1− d
)
 = O(). (38)
Finally, if we are using GMF-V and have assumed that Alg satisfies a value-based guarantee with
parameters {C(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }mi=1, plugging in k and δk into TML(δk, k), and noticing that
k≤K,η and
∑K,η−1
k=0 (k + 1)
α ≤ Kα+1,ηα+1 , we have
T =
K,η∑
k=0
m∑
i=1
C
(i)
M
(
1
k
)α(i)1 (
log
1
k
)α(i)2 ( 1
δk
)α(i)3 (
log
1
δk
)α(i)4
=
K,η∑
k=0
m∑
i=1
(1 + η)α
(i)
2 C
(i)
M(k + 1)
α
(i)
1 (1+η)(log(k + 1))α
(i)
2 (K,η/δ)
α
(i)
3 (log(K,η/δ))
α
(i)
4
≤
m∑
i=1
(1 + η)α
(i)
2
α
(i)
1 (1 + η) + 1
C
(i)
MK
α
(i)
1 (1+η)+1
,η (log(K,η + 1))
α
(i)
2 (K,η/δ)
α
(i)
3 (log(K,η/δ))
α
(i)
4
≤
m∑
i=1
2α
(i)
2
2α
(i)
1 + 1
C
(i)
MK
2α
(i)
1 +1
,η (K,η/δ)
α
(i)
3 (log(K,η/δ))
α
(i)
2 +α
(i)
4 ,
(39)
which completes the proof of the value-based case.
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Proof. [Proof of Theorem 8] Now If we are using GMF-P and have assumed that Alg has a policy-
based guarantee, then by Lemma 7 (and its proof, which provides a construction of an approximate
Q-function satisfying a value-based guarantee), with our choice of Mk, lk (k ≥ 0), by Lemma 7) we
have
P
(∥∥∥QˆpˆikM,M,l −Q?M∥∥∥∞ > ) ≤ 2δ. (40)
Hence we can simply replace Qˆ?k with Qˆ
pˆik
M,M,l in the proof above, which results in the same bound
on W1(LK,η ,L?) (cf. (38)). The only difference is that in each iteration, the required number
of samples TML now has parameters {C˜(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }m+1i=1 as defined in Lemma 7. Hence
repeating the proof of (39) leads to (22). This completes the proof.
7 Experiment: repeated auction game
In this section, we report the performance of the proposed GMF-V-Q Algorithm. The objectives of
the experiments include 1) testing the convergence, stability, and learning ability of GMF-V-Q in
the GMFG setting, and 2) comparing GMF-V-Q with existing multi-agent reinforcement learning
algorithms, including IL algorithm and MF-Q algorithm.
7.1 Testing ground: repeated auction
We begin by describing the two testing environments of our numerical experiments, both of which are
based on the repeated Vickrey auction with a budget constraint in Section 1. Here each advertiser
learns to bid in the auction with a budget constraint.
Repeated auction as a GMFG. We first state the GMFG framework for the repeated auction
game, in which the GMF-V-Q algorithm is tested. Take a representative advertiser in the auction.
Denote st ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , smax} as the budget of this player at time t, where smax ∈ N+ is the
maximum budget allowed on the Ad exchange with a unit bidding price. Denote at as the bid price
submitted by this player and αt as the bidding/(action) distribution of the population. The reward
for this advertiser with bid at and budget st is
rt = IwMt =1
[
(vt − aMt )− (1 + ρ)Ist<aMt (a
M
t − st)
]
. (41)
Here wMt takes values 1 and 0, with wMt = 1 meaning this player winning the bid and 0 otherwise.
The probability of winning the bid would depend on M , the index for the game intensity, and αt.
(See discussion on M in Appendix D.1.) The conversion of clicks at time t is vt and follows an
unknown distribution. aMt is the value of the second largest bid at time t, taking values from 0 to
smax, and depends on both M and Lt. Should the player win the bid, the reward rt consists of two
parts, corresponding to the two terms in (41). The first term is the profit of wining the auction, as
the winner only needs to pay for the second best bid aMt in a Vickrey auction. The second term is
the penalty of overshooting if the payment exceeds her budget, with a penalty rate ρ. At each time
t, the budget dynamics st follows,
st+1 =

st, w
M
t 6= 1,
st − aMt , wMt = 1 and aMt ≤ st,
0, wMt = 1 and aMt > st.
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That is, if this player does not win the bid, the budget will remain the same. If she wins and has
enough money to pay, her budget will decrease from st to st− aMt . However, if she wins but does not
have enough money, her budget will be 0 after the payment and there will be a penalty in the reward
function. Note that in this game, both the rewards rt and the dynamics st are unknown a priori.
In practice, one often modifies the dynamics of st+1 with a non-negative random budget fulfillment
∆(st+1) after the auction clearing [3, 21], such that sˆt+1 = st+1 + ∆(st+1). One may see some
particular choices of ∆(st+1) in the experiments later in this section.
Repeated auction as an N-player game. We also consider an N -player game version of the
repeated auction game, which is the GMFG version described above with an N -player weak simulator
oracle as described in §5. In this setting, accordingly, we test the performance of GMF-VW-Q, which
is GMF-VW (Algorithm 5) with Q-learning and the standard softmax operator (cf. Algorithm 7).
Algorithm 7 Q-learning for GMFGs (GMF-VW-Q): weak simulator
1: Input: Initial L0, -net S, tolerances k, δk > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . .
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Perform Q-learning with hyper-parameters in Lemma 5 for Tk = TMLk (k, δk) iterations to
find the approximate Q-function Qˆ?k = Qˆ
Tk of the MDPMLk .
4: Compute pik ∈ Π with pik(s) = softmaxc(Qˆ?k(s, ·)).
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N do
6: Sample si
i.i.d.∼ µk, then obtain s′i i.i.d. from GW (si, pik,Lk) and a′i i.i.d.∼ pik(s′i).
end for
Compute Lk+1 with Lk+1(s, a) = 1N
∑N
i=1 Is′i=s,a′i=a.
9: end for
7.2 Parameter configuration and performance evaluation
Parameters. The model parameters are set as: |S| = |A| = 10, the overbidding penalty ρ = 0.2,
the distributions of the conversion rate v ∼ Unif{1,2,3,4}, and the competition intensity index M = 5.
The random fulfillment is chosen as: if s < smax, ∆(s) = 1 with probability 12 and ∆(s) = 0 with
probability 12 ; if s = smax, ∆(s) = 0. The discount factor γ is set to 0.8.
The algorithm parameters are (unless otherwise specified): the temperature parameter c = 4.0,
the parameter h from Lemma 5 being h = 0.87. For simplicity, we set the inner iteration Tk to a
constant (2000 by default). Recall that for GMF-V-Q and GMF-VW-Q, both v and the dynamics of
P for s are unknown a priori. The 90%-confidence intervals are calculated with 20 sample paths.
Performance evaluation in the GMFG setting. Our experiment shows that the GMF-V-Q
Algorithm is efficient and robust, and learns well.
Convergence and stability of GMF-V-Q. GMF-V-Q is efficient and robust. First, GMF-V-Q
converges after about 10 outer iterations; secondly, as the number of inner iterations increases, the
error decreases (Figure 2); and finally, the convergence is robust with respect to both the change of
number of states and the initial population distribution (Figure 3).
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(a) GMF-V-Q. (b) GMF-VI.
Figure 1: Q-tables: GMF-V-Q vs. GMF-VI.
In contrast, the Naive algorithm does not converge even with 10000 inner iterations, and the
joint distribution Lt keeps fluctuating (Figure 4).
Learning accuracy of GMF-V-Q. GMF-V-Q learns well. Its learning accuracy is tested against its
special form GMF-VI (Appendix C), with the latter assuming a known distribution of conversion
rate v and the dynamics P for the budget s. The relative L2 distance between the Q-tables of these
two algorithms is ∆Q := ‖QGMF-VI−QGMF-V-Q‖2‖QGMF-VI‖2 = 0.098879. This implies that GMF-V-Q learns the
true GMFG solution with 90-percent accuracy with 10000 inner iterations.
The heatmap in Figure 1(a) is the Q-table for GMF-V-Q Algorithm after 20 outer iterations.
Within each outer iteration, there are TGMF-V-Qk = 10000 inner iterations. The heatmap in Figure 1(b)
is the Q-table for GMF-V-Q Algorithm after 20 outer iterations. Within each outer iteration, there
are TGMF-VIk = 5000 inner iterations.
Table 1: Q-table with TGMF-VIk = 5000.
TGMF-V-Qk 1000 3000 5000 10000
∆Q 0.21263 0.1294 0.10258 0.0989
Comparison with existing algorithms for N-player games. To test the effectiveness of
GMF-VW-Q for approximating N -player games, we next compare GMF-VW-Q with IL algorithm
and MF-Q algorithm. IL algorithm [49] considers N independent players and each player solves
a decentralized reinforcement learning problem ignoring other players in the system. The MF-Q
algorithm [53] extends the NASH-Q Learning algorithm for the N -player game introduced in [26],
adds the aggregate actions (a¯−i =
∑
j 6=i aj
N−1 ) from the opponents, and works for the class of games
where the interactions are only through the average actions of N players.
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Figure 2: Convergence with different
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Figure 4: Fluctuations of Naive Algorithm (30 sample paths).
(a) |S| = |A| = 10, N = 20. (b) |S| = |A| = 20, N = 20. (c) |S| = |A| = 10, N = 40.
Figure 5: Learning accuracy based on C(pi).
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Performance metric. We adopt the following metric to measure the difference between a given
policy pi and an NE (here 0 > 0 is a safeguard, and is taken as 0.1 in the experiments):
C(pi) =
1
N |S|N
∑N
i=1
∑
s∈SN
maxpii V
i(s, (pi−i, pii))− V i(s,pi)
|maxpii V i(s, (pi−i, pii))|+ 0
.
Clearly C(pi) ≥ 0, and C(pi∗) = 0 if and only if pi∗ is an NE. Policy arg maxpii Vi(s, (pi−i, pii)) is
called the best response to pi−i. A similar metric without normalization has been adopted in [42].
Our experiment (Figure 5) shows that GMF-VW-Q is superior in terms of convergence rate,
accuracy, and stability for approximating an N -player game: GMF-VW-Q converges faster than IL
and MF-Q, with the smallest error, and with the lowest variance, as -net improves the stability.
For instance, when N = 20, IL Algorithm converges with the largest error 0.220. The error from
MF-Q is 0.101, smaller than IL but still bigger than the error from GMF-VW-Q. The GMF-VW-Q
converges with the lowest error 0.065. Moreover, as N increases, the error of GMF-VW-Q deceases
while the errors of both MF-Q and IL increase significantly. As |S| and |A| increase, GMF-VW-Q
is robust with respect to this increase of dimensionality, while both MF-Q and IL clearly suffer
from the increase of the dimensionality with decreased convergence rate and accuracy. Therefore,
GMF-VW-Q is more scalable than IL and MF-Q, when the system is complex and the number of
players N is large.
8 Extension: Existence and uniqueness for non-stationary NE of
GMFGs
In this section, we describe the setting of non-stationary NE for GMFGs and establish the corre-
sponding results of existence and uniqueness.
Definition 8.1 (NE for GMFGs). In (GMFG), a player-population profile (pi?,L?) := ({pi?t }∞t=0, {L?t }∞t=0)
is called an NE if
1. (Single player side) Fix L?, for any policy sequence pi := {pit}∞t=0 and initial state s ∈ S,
V (s,pi?,L?) ≥ V (s,pi,L?) . (42)
2. (Population side) Pst,at = L?t for all t ≥ 0, where {st, at}∞t=0 is the dynamics under the policy
sequence pi? starting from s0 ∼ µ?0, with at ∼ pi?t (st, µ?t ), st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at,L?t ), and µ?t being
the population state marginal of L?t .
Step 1. Fix L := {Lt}∞t=0, (GMFG) becomes the classical optimization problem. Indeed, with
L fixed, the population state distribution sequence µ := {µt}∞t=0 is also fixed, hence the space of
admissible policies is reduced to the single-player case. Solving (GMFG) is now reduced to finding a
policy sequence pi?t,L ∈ Π := {pi |pi : S → P(A)} over all admissible piL = {pit,L}∞t=0, to maximize
V (s,piL,L) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at,Lt)|s0 = s
]
,
subject to st+1 ∼ P (st, at,Lt), at ∼ pit,L(st).
Notice that with L fixed, one can safely suppress the dependency on µt in the admissible policies.
Moreover, given this fixed L sequence and the solution pi?L := {pi?t,L}∞t=0, one can define a mapping
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from the fixed population distribution sequence L to an optimal randomized policy sequence. That
is,
Γ1 : {P(S ×A)}∞t=0 → {Π}∞t=0,
such that pi?L = Γ1(L). Note that this pi?L sequence satisfies the single player side condition in
Definition 8.1 for the population state-action pair sequence L. That is, V (s,pi?L,L) ≥ V (s,pi,L) ,
for any policy sequence pi = {pit}∞t=0 and any initial state s ∈ S.
Accordingly, a similar feedback regularity condition is needed in this step.
Assumption 3. There exists a constant d1 ≥ 0, such that for any L,L′ ∈ {P(S ×A)}∞t=0,
D(Γ1(L),Γ1(L′)) ≤ d1W1(L,L′), (43)
where
D(pi,pi ′) := sup
s∈S
W1(pi(s),pi ′(s)) = sup
s∈S
sup
t∈N
W1(pit(s), pi
′
t(s)),
W1(L,L′) := sup
t∈N
W1(Lt,L′t),
(44)
and W1 is the `1-Wasserstein distance between probability measures.
Step 2. Based on the analysis in Step A and pi?L = {pi?t,L}∞t=0, update the initial sequence L to L′
following the controlled dynamics P (·|st, at,Lt).
Accordingly, for any admissible policy sequence pi ∈ {Π}∞t=0 and a joint population state-action
pair sequence L ∈ {P(S ×A)}∞t=0, define a mapping Γ2 : {Π}∞t=0×{P(S ×A)}∞t=0 → {P(S ×A)}∞t=0
as follows:
Γ2(pi,L) := Lˆ = {Pst,at}∞t=0, (45)
where st+1 ∼ µtP (·|·, at,Lt), at ∼ pit(st), s0 ∼ µ0, and µt is the population state marginal of Lt.
One also needs a similar assumption in this step.
Assumption 4. There exist constants d2, d3 ≥ 0, such that for any admissible policy sequences
pi,pi1,pi2 and joint distribution sequences L,L1,L2,
W1(Γ2(pi1,L),Γ2(pi2,L)) ≤ d2D(pi1,pi2), (46)
W1(Γ2(pi,L1),Γ2(pi,L2)) ≤ d3W1(L1,L2). (47)
Similarly, Assumption 4 can be reduced to Lipschitz continuity and boundedness of the transition
dynamics P under certain conditions.
Step 3. Repeat Step A and Step B until L′ matches L.
This step is to take care of the population side condition. To ensure the convergence of the
combined step A and step B, it suffices if Γ : {P(S × A)}∞t=0 → {P(S × A)}∞t=0 is a contractive
mapping under the W1 distance, with Γ(L) := Γ2(Γ1(L),L). Then by the Banach fixed point
theorem and the completeness of the related metric spaces, there exists a unique NE to the GMFG.
In summary, we have
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Theorem 14 (Existence and Uniqueness of GMFG solution). Given Assumptions 3 and 4, and
assuming that d1d2 + d3 < 1, there exists a unique NE to (GMFG).
The proof of Theorem 14 can be established by modifying appropriately the fixed-point approach
for the stationary GMFG in Theorem 1.
29
References
[1] B. Acciaio, J. Backhoff, and R. Carmona. Extended mean field control problems: stochastic
maximum principle and transport perspective. Arxiv Preprint:1802.05754, 2018.
[2] B. Anahtarcı, C. D. Karıksız, and N. Saldi. Fitted Q-learning in mean-field games. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1912.13309, 2019.
[3] N. Andelman and Y. Mansour. Auctions with budget constraints. In Scandinavian Workshop
on Algorithm Theory, pages 26–38. Springer, 2004.
[4] K. Asadi and M. L. Littman. An alternative softmax operator for reinforcement learning.
In Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning, volume 70, pages
243–252, 2017.
[5] M. G. Bellemare, G. Ostrovski, A. Guez, P. S. Thomas, and R. Munos. Increasing the action
gap: new operators for reinforcement learning. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 1476–1483, 2016.
[6] M. Benaim and J. Y. Le Boudec. A class of mean field interaction models for computer and
communication systems. Performance evaluation, 65(11-12):823–838, 2008.
[7] F. Bolley. Separability and completeness for the Wasserstein distance. Séminaire de Probabilités
XLI, pages 371–377, 2008.
[8] H. Cai, K. Ren, W. Zhang, K. Malialis, J. Wang, Y. Yu, and D. Guo. Real-time bidding by
reinforcement learning in display advertising. In Proceedings of the Tenth ACM International
Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, pages 661–670. ACM, 2017.
[9] R. Carmona, M. Laurière, and Z. Tan. Linear-quadratic mean-field reinforcement learning:
convergence of policy gradient methods. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.04295, 2019.
[10] R. Carmona, M. Laurière, and Z Tan. Model-free mean-field reinforcement learning: mean-field
MDP and mean-field Q-learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.12802, 2019.
[11] E. Derman and S. Mannor. Distributional robustness and regularization in reinforcement
learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.02894, 2020.
[12] R. Elie, J. Pérolat, M. Laurière, M. Geist, and O. Pietquin. Approximate fictitious play for
mean field games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.02633, 2019.
[13] E. Even-Dar and Y. Mansour. Learning rates for Q-learning. Journal of Machine Learning
Research, 5(Dec):1–25, 2003.
[14] Z. Fu, Z. Yang, Y. Chen, and Z. Wang. Actor-critic provably finds nash equilibria of linear-
quadratic mean-field games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.07498, 2019.
[15] B. Gao and L. Pavel. On the properties of the softmax function with application in game theory
and reinforcement learning. Arxiv Preprint:1704.00805, 2017.
[16] M. Geist, B. Scherrer, and O. Pietquin. A theory of regularized Markov decision processes.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.11275, 2019.
30
[17] A. L. Gibbs and F. E. Su. On choosing and bounding probability metrics. International
Statistical Review, 70(3):419–435, 2002.
[18] D. A. Gomes, J. Mohr, and R. R. Souza. Discrete time, finite state space mean field games.
Journal de mathématiques pures et appliquées, 93(3):308–328, 2010.
[19] H. Gu, X. Guo, X. Wei, and R. Xu. Dynamic programming principles for learning mfcs. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1911.07314, 2019.
[20] H. Gu, X. Guo, X. Wei, and R. Xu. Q-learning for mean-field controls. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2002.04131, 2020.
[21] R. Gummadi, P. Key, and A. Proutiere. Repeated auctions under budget constraints: Optimal
bidding strategies and equilibria. In the Eighth Ad Auction Workshop, 2012.
[22] X. Guo, A. Hu, R. Xu, and J. Zhang. Learning mean-field games. In Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, pages 4967–4977, 2019.
[23] T. Haarnoja, H. Tang, P. Abbeel, and S. Levine. Reinforcement learning with deep energy-based
policies. Arxiv Preprint:1702.08165, 2017.
[24] J. Hamari, M. Sjöklint, and A. Ukkonen. The sharing economy: Why people participate in
collaborative consumption. Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology,
67(9):2047–2059, 2016.
[25] P. Hernandez-Leal, B. Kartal, and M. E. Taylor. Is multiagent deep reinforcement learning the
answer or the question? A brief survey. Arxiv Preprint:1810.05587, 2018.
[26] J. Hu and M. P. Wellman. Nash Q-learning for general-sum stochastic games. Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 4(Nov):1039–1069, 2003.
[27] M. Huang and Y. Ma. Mean field stochastic games with binary action spaces and monotone
costs. ArXiv Preprint:1701.06661, 2017.
[28] M. Huang, R. P. Malhamé, and P. E. Caines. Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-
loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle. Communications in
Information & Systems, 6(3):221–252, 2006.
[29] K. Iyer, R. Johari, and M. Sundararajan. Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with
learning. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 10(3):10–14, 2011.
[30] S. H. Jeong, A. R. Kang, and H. K. Kim. Analysis of game bot’s behavioral characteristics in
social interaction networks of MMORPG. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review,
45(4):99–100, 2015.
[31] J. Jin, C. Song, H. Li, K. Gai, J. Wang, and W. Zhang. Real-time bidding with multi-agent
reinforcement learning in display advertising. Arxiv Preprint:1802.09756, 2018.
[32] S. Kapoor. Multi-agent reinforcement learning: A report on challenges and approaches. Arxiv
Preprint:1807.09427, 2018.
31
[33] A. C Kizilkale and P. E Caines. Mean field stochastic adaptive control. IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, 58(4):905–920, 2013.
[34] J-M. Lasry and P-L. Lions. Mean field games. Japanese Journal of Mathematics, 2(1):229–260,
2007.
[35] C-A. Lehalle and C. Mouzouni. A mean field game of portfolio trading and its consequences on
perceived correlations. ArXiv Preprint:1902.09606, 2019.
[36] J. P. M. López. Discrete time mean field games: The short-stage limit. Journal of Dynamics &
Games, 2(1):89–101, 2015.
[37] Yuwei Luo, Zhuoran Yang, Zhaoran Wang, and Mladen Kolar. Natural actor-critic converges
globally for hierarchical linear quadratic regulator. arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.06875, 2019.
[38] D. Mguni, J. Jennings, and E. M. de Cote. Decentralised learning in systems with many, many
strategic agents. In Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.
[39] V. M. Minh, A. P. Badia, M. Mirza, A. Graves, T. P. Lillicrap, T. Harley, D. Silver, and
K. Kavukcuoglu. Asynchronous methods for deep reinforcement learning. In International
Conference on Machine Learning, 2016.
[40] G. Neu, A. Jonsson, and V. Gómez. A unified view of entropy-regularized Markov decision
processes. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07798, 2017.
[41] C. H. Papadimitriou and T. Roughgarden. Computing equilibria in multi-player games. In
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 82–91,
2005.
[42] J. Pérolat, B. Piot, and O. Pietquin. Actor-critic fictitious play in simultaneous move multistage
games. In International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2018.
[43] J. Pérolat, F. Strub, B. Piot, and O. Pietquin. Learning Nash equilibrium for general-sum
Markov games from batch data. Arxiv Preprint:1606.08718, 2016.
[44] G. Peyré and M. Cuturi. Computational optimal transport. Foundations and Trends in Machine
Learning, 11(5-6):355–607, 2019.
[45] N. Saldi, T. Basar, and M. Raginsky. Markov–Nash equilibria in mean-field games with
discounted cost. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 56(6):4256–4287, 2018.
[46] J. Schulman, S. Levine, P. Abbeel, M. Jordan, and P. Moritz. Trust region policy optimization.
In International conference on machine learning, pages 1889–1897, 2015.
[47] L. Shani, Y. Efroni, and S. Mannor. Adaptive trust region policy optimization: Global
convergence and faster rates for regularized mdps. arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.02769, 2019.
[48] J. Subramanian and A. Mahajan. Reinforcement learning in stationary mean-field games. In
18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 251–259,
2019.
32
[49] M. Tan. Multi-agent reinforcement learning: independent vs. cooperative agents. In International
Conference on Machine Learning, pages 330–337, 1993.
[50] C. Villani. Optimal transport: old and new, volume 338. Springer Science & Business Media,
2008.
[51] H. T. Wai, Z. Yang, Z. Wang, and M. Hong. Multi-agent reinforcement learning via double
averaging primal-dual optimization. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
pages 9672–9683, 2018.
[52] J. Yang, X. Ye, R. Trivedi, H. Xu, and H. Zha. Deep mean field games for learning optimal
behavior policy of large populations. Arxiv Preprint:1711.03156, 2017.
[53] Y. Yang, R. Luo, M. Li, M. Zhou, W. Zhang, and J. Wang. Mean field multi-agent reinforcement
learning. Arxiv Preprint:1802.05438, 2018.
[54] H. Yin, P. G. Mehta, S. P. Meyn, and U. V. Shanbhag. Learning in mean-field games. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, 59(3):629–644, 2013.
33
A Distance metrics and completeness
This section reviews some basic properties of the Wasserstein distance. It then proves that the
metrics defined in the main text are indeed distance functions and define complete metric spaces.
`1-Wasserstein distance and dual representation. The `1 Wasserstein distance over P(X )
for X ⊆ Rk is defined as
W1(ν, ν
′) := inf
M∈M(ν,ν′)
∫
X×X
‖x− y‖2dM(x, y). (48)
whereM(ν, ν ′) is the set of all measures (couplings) on X × X , with marginals ν and ν ′ on the two
components, respectively.
The Kantorovich duality theorem enables the following equivalent dual representation of W1:
W1(ν, ν
′) = sup
‖f‖L≤1
∣∣∣∣∫X fdν −
∫
X
fdν ′
∣∣∣∣ , (49)
where the supremum is taken over all 1-Lipschitz functions f , i.e., f satisfying |f(x)−f(y)| ≤ ‖x−y‖2
for all x, y ∈ X .
The Wasserstein distance W1 can also be related to the total variation distance via the following
inequalities [17]:
dmin(X )dTV (ν, ν ′) ≤W1(ν, ν ′) ≤ diam(X )dTV (ν, ν ′), (50)
where dmin(X ) = minx 6=y∈X ‖x− y‖2, which is guaranteed to be positive when X is finite.
When S and A are compact, for any compact subset X ⊆ Rk, and for any ν, ν ′ ∈ P(X ),
W1(ν, ν
′) ≤ diam(X )dTV (ν, ν ′) ≤ diam(X ) < ∞, where diam(X ) = supx,y∈X ‖x − y‖2 and dTV is
the total variation distance. Moreover, one can verify
Lemma 15. Both D and W1 are distance functions, and they are finite for any input distribution
pairs. In addition, both ({Π}∞t=0, D) and ({P(S ×A)}∞t=0,W1) are complete metric spaces.
These facts enable the usage of Banach fixed-point mapping theorem for the proof of existence
and uniqueness (Theorems 14 and 1).
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 15] It is known that for any compact set X ⊆ Rk, (P(X ),W1) defines a
complete metric space [7]. Since W1(ν, ν ′) ≤ diam(X ) is uniformly bounded for any ν, ν ′ ∈ P(X ),
we know that W1(L,L′) ≤ diam(X ) and D(pi,pi′) ≤ diam(X ) as well, so they are both finite for any
input distribution pairs. It is clear that they are distance functions based on the fact that W1 is a
distance function.
Finally, we show the completeness of the two metric spaces ({Π}∞t=0, D) and ({P(S×A)}∞t=0,W1).
Take ({Π}∞t=0, D) for example. Suppose that pik is a Cauchy sequence in ({Π}∞t=0, D). Then for any
 > 0, there exists a positive integer N , such that for any m, n ≥ N ,
D(pin,pim) ≤  =⇒W1(pint (s), pimt (s)) ≤  for any s ∈ S, t ∈ N, (51)
which implies that pikt (s) forms a Cauchy sequence in (P(A),W1), and hence by the completeness of
(P(A),W1), pikt (s) converges to some pit(s) ∈ P(A). As a result, pin → pi ∈ {Π}∞t=0 under metric D,
which shows that ({Π}∞t=0, D) is complete.
The completeness of ({P(S ×A)}∞t=0,W1) can be proved similarly.
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The same argument for Lemma 15 shows that both D and W1 are distance functions and are
finite for any input distribution pairs, with both (Π, D) and (P(S ×A),W1) again complete metric
spaces.
B Weak simulator
In this section, we state the counterpart of Theorems 3 and 8 for Algorithms 5 and 6, respectively.
Notice that here the major difference is the additional O(1/
√
N) term.
We first (re)state the relation between EmpN (which serves as a 1/N -net) and action gaps:
For any positive integer N , there exist a positive constant φN > 0, with the property that
maxa′∈AQ?L(s, a
′)−Q?L(s, a) ≥ φN for any L ∈ EmpN , s ∈ S, and any a /∈ argmaxa∈AQ?L(s, a).
Now we are ready to state the convergence results.
Theorem 16 (Convergence and complexity of GMF-VW). Assume the same assumptions as Theorem
1. Suppose that Alg has a value-based guarantee with parameters
{C(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }mi=1.
For any , δ > 0, set δk = δ/K,η, k = (k + 1)−(1+η) for some η ∈ (0, 1] (k = 0, . . . ,K,η − 1),
and c′ = c = log(1/)φN .
4 Then with probability at least 1− 4δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤ C+
diam(S)diam(A)|S||A|
2(1− d)
√
1
2N
log(|S||A|K,η/δ).
Here K,η :=
⌈
2 max
{
(η/c)−1/η, logd(/max{diam(S)diam(A), c}) + 1
}⌉
is the number of outer
iterations, and the constant C is independent of δ,  and η.
Moreover, the total number of samples T =
∑K,η−1
k=0 TMLk (δk, k) is bounded by
T ≤
m∑
i=1
2α
(i)
2
2α
(i)
1 + 1
C
(i)
MK
2α
(i)
1 +1
,η (K,η/δ)
α
(i)
3 (log(K,η/δ))
α
(i)
2 +α
(i)
4 . (52)
Theorem 17 (Convergence and complexity of GMF-PW). Assume the same assumptions as in
Theorem 1. Suppose that Alg has a policy-based guarantee with parameters
{C(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }mi=1.
Then for any , δ > 0, set δk = δ/K,η, k = (k+1)−(1+η) for some η ∈ (0, 1] (k = 0, . . . ,K,η−1),
and c′ = c = log(1/)φN ,
5 with probability at least 1− 4δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤ C+
diam(S)diam(A)|S||A|
2(1− d)
√
1
2N
log(|S||A|K,η/δ).
4Here we actually only need c′ = Ω( log(1/)
φN
) and c = O( log(1/)
φN
), and the corresponding result will differ only in
some absolute constants.
5Here again we actually only need c′ = Ω( log(1/)
φN
) and c = O( log(1/)
φN
), and the corresponding result will differ only
in some absolute constants.
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Here K,η :=
⌈
2 max
{
(η/c)−1/η, logd(/max{diam(S)diam(A), c}) + 1
}⌉
is the number of outer
iterations, and the constant C is independent of δ,  and η.
Moreover, the total number of samples T =
∑K,η−1
k=0 TMLk (δk, k) is bounded by
T ≤
m+1∑
i=1
2α
(i)
2
2α
(i)
1 + 1
C˜
(i)
MK
2α
(i)
1 +1
,η (K,η/δ)
α
(i)
3 (log(K,η/δ))
α
(i)
2 +α
(i)
4 , (53)
where the parameters {C˜(i)M, α(i)1 , α(i)2 , α(i)3 , α(i)4 }m+1i=1 are defined in Lemma 7.
The key to the proof of Theorems 16 and 17 is the following lemma, which follows from the
Hoeffding inequality.
Lemma 18. The expectation E [Lk+1(s′, a′)] = pik(s′, a′)
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A µk(s)P (s
′|s, a,Lk)pik(s, a) =
Γ2(pik,Lk). In addition, we have that for any t > 0, s′ ∈ S and a′ ∈ A,
P
(∣∣Lk+1(s′, a′)− E [Lk+1(s′, a′)]∣∣ ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp (−2Nt2) . (54)
The above lemma essentially states that the iterates Lk+1 of Algorithms 5 and 6 are very close
to the “L˜k+1” obtained from the (strong) simulator G(s, pik,Lk) with s ∼ µk following line 5 in
Algorithm 2 and line 6 in Algorithm 4. This bridges the gap between the weak and the strong
simulators. In particular, by noticing that
W1(Lk+1,L?) ≤W1(Lk+1,Γ2(pik,Lk)) +W1(Γ2(pik,Lk),Γ2(Γ1(L?),L?))
= W1(Lk+1,E [Lk+1]) +W1(Γ2(pik,Lk),Γ2(Γ1(L?),L?))
≤ diam(S)diam(A)|S||A|
2
‖Lk+1 − E [Lk+1]‖∞ +W1(Γ2(pik,Lk),Γ2(Γ1(L?),L?)),
one can bound the first term with high probability via (54). The second term is then bounded in
exactly the same way as the proofs for Theorems 3 and 8, and hence we omit the details.
C Value Iteration for GMFGs
Value Iteration for GMFGs, briefly mentioned in Section 4, is the value-iteration version of our main
algorithm GMF-V-Q. It applies to the GMFG setting with fully known transition dynamics P and
rewards r.
D More details for the experiments
D.1 Competition intensity index M .
In the experiment, the competition index M is interpreted and implemented as the number of
selected players in each auction competition. That is, in each round, M − 1 players will be randomly
selected from the population to compete with the representative advertiser for the auction. Therefore,
the population distribution Lt, the winner indicator wMt , and second-best price aMt all depend on
M . This parameter M is also referred to as the auction thickness in the auction literature [29].
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Algorithm 8 Value Iteration for GMFGs (GMF-VI)
1: Input: Initial L0, -net S, subproblem max iterations Tk, k = 0, 1, . . . .
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Perform value iteration for Tk iterations to find the approximate Q-function QLk and value
function VLk :
4: for t = 1, 2, · · · , Tk
5: for all s ∈ S and s ∈ A
6: QLk(s, a)← E[r(s, a,Lk)] + γ
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, a,Lk)VLk(s′)
7: VLk(s)← maxaQLk(s, a)
8: end for
9: end for
10: Compute a policy pik ∈ Π: pik(s) = softmaxc(QLk(s, ·)).
11: Sample s ∼ µk, where µk is the population state marginal of Lk, and obtain L˜k+1 from
G(s, pik,Lk).
12: Find Lk+1 = ProjS(L˜k+1)
13: end for
D.2 Adjustment for Algorithm MF-Q.
For MF-Q, [53] assumes all N players have a joint state s. In the auction experiment, we make the
following adjustment for MF-Q for computational efficiency and model comparability: each player i
makes decision based on her own private state and table Qi is a functional of si, ai and
∑
j 6=i a
j
N−1 .
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